The marginalization of the Cordilleras occurred a long period of time. Geography may have played a role in preserving the indigenous culture of the Cordilleras and preventing colonization. But difficult land travel also deprived the region to the modernizing processes that took place in the lowlands.

The road to “otherness,” or the official state policy that drew a divide between lowland Christian communities with those from the Cordillera started during the American colonial period with the establishment of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. At any given time, there were three American governors-general in the Philippines – one based in Manila, another in Bontoc and the third in Zamboanga. Both Moros and Igorots were administered separately from the Christian majority.

By 1957, the Philippine government replaced the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes with another entity, the Commission on National Integration. Still, the idea was to integrate the “Igorots” into the mainstream. To teach, civilize them in the ways of the modern so that they can be fully integrated or up to par with the rest of the Filipinos.

The Commission of National Integration was abolished and in its stead was created the Presidential Assistance for National Minorities (PANAMIN). It was during this time when the Cordillera region was seen more as a resource base, a site for extractive industries. In spite of being one contiguous area, the Cordillera was subdivided without regard to the history, customs and traditions of its people. Benguet, Mountain Province belonged Region 1 while Kalinga- Apayao belonged to Region II by virtue of Presidential Decree #1 signed by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos on September 24, 1972. The rich natural resources of the Cordilleras were seen as sustenance for the requirements of other provinces with larger populations but with limited resources, notably the two Ilocos provinces and Pangasinan. Thus, Ilokanos and Pangasinenses have flocked to Baguio and nearby areas for greener pastures when these areas began to develop.

The Chico River Dam project is but one of four hydroelectric projects the government planned to harness in order to address an anticipated energy shortfall in the years to come. The Pasil river was also intended to be dammed along with the Chico River. Resistance against the government’s aggressive river dams project stemmed also from other projects that would greatly affect ancestral lands, among them the timber concession granted to Cellophil Resources Corp. (or CRC), a paper and pulp enterprise owned and operated by Marcos crony Herminio Disini.

While the Kalingas ang Bontoks were radicalized against the Chico and Pasil rivers dam project, and the Tingguians of Abra, against Cellophil. It was after the Chico river dam project gained national attention and the death of Macli-ing Dulag did the resistance gained a Cordillera-wide character. i.e., uniting all the peoples of the Cordilleras centered around the Chico river dam with many underlying issues subsumed therein. Together, it became the symbol against the dictatorship an making it part and parcel of the national struggle.

The earliest reference to the Chico River Basin Development Project was in 1962. The National Power Corporation (NPC) undertook a feasibility study on the potentials of hydroelectric power. Earlier examples of the dam projects include Angat, Ambuklao and Binga dams in Luzon. They became the model by which the Chico River dam project would be based. The project called for the construction of 4 dams along the Chico and Pasil rivers in Mountain Province and Kalinga, respectively. Of the 4 dams, two are located in Mt. Province (Bontoc and Sadanga) while the two others are in Kalinga (Basao and Tomiangan). Based on NAPOCOR’s estimates, the total catchment area for the four dams stood at around 3,419 square kilometers and will submerge 27.53 square kilometers of land but will in turn generate 1010 MW of electric power. But because of the huge costs involved, the project was shelved.

By 1973 however, the dramatic increase in oil prices imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) shook the world. With 97% of its oil requirements dependent on imports, the Philippines faced a huge dilemma. Suddenly, demand for alternative electric power to lessen dependence on oil products became imperative.

Another feasibility study was taken by a German consulting firm Lahmeyer International (based in Frankfurt) and the Filipino company, Engineering and Development Corp. of the Philippines. This time they came to the conclusion that only Chico II (Sadanga) and Chico IV (Tomiangan) are feasible. Later, the Agno river dam project (Agno III) in Benguet was added and given a go-signal alongside the construction of the Chico II and III river dam project.

Chico II would directly affect around 500 families in barangays Anabel, Tucocan and Betwagan while Chico IV would displace 672 families in barangays Ableg, Cagaluan, Dupag, Tanglag, Dognac and Mabongtot. Comparatively smaller, the Agno III project would displace around 1,200 residents. And while their houses would not be submerged, they would have to be resettled as they are to lose their farms.

Aside from the river dam project, communities in the Cordillera were also threatened by the expansive timber concession granted to Cellophil Resources Corp. (or Cellophil) whose owner, Herminio Disini, was a known Marcos crony. Cellophil was into the paper and pulp business. This vast concession, estimated at 200,000 hectares, threatened to deforest and destroy agricultural lands in Abra, Kalinga Apayao and Mountain Province. Deforestation was seen to be as preparation for the construction of the proposed dam project.

It was the entry of NAPOCOR engineering teams doing survey work in the Cordillera that first startled the communities to be affected by the dam project. Much conspicuous for their appearance and language as they were outsiders, the residents wondered why they were surveying the areas without permission from their elders. Only by inquiring about their purpose did they learn of the ambitious project that would eventually displace them.

It did not take long for officials of the NAPOCOR, including visits by its president Gabriel Itchon, to convince the residents of the benefits of the dam project to the country and at the same laid out compensation packages for those willing to be relocated.

In response, the community organizers organized a trip to two resettlement areas for those affected by the Magat and Ambuklao dam projects. The site showed not only of inadequate facilities but more so the indigenous communities could no longer perform their traditional tasks of planting, hunting and gathering as there was no ancestral land to speak of, only plots of land to build their houses and plant vegetables and flowers. This convinced the Cordillera people further to resist attempts at relocation and an affirmation that their struggle was the right thing to do.

In response to NPC’s disregard for their pleas to stop the dam’s construction and the abuses committed by Constabulary troopers, the affected communities sent petitions to Pres. Marcos through various emissaries. Asking elected leaders to intercede in their behalf, community elders drafted petitions in the hope that these will reach President Marcos in Malacanang. When these efforts failed, they resorted to another tactic – sending delegations to Manila in the hope of having an audience with the president. In the whole of 1974, five delegations were organized. The of these as on March 10 when they handed their petition to Marcos PR man, Teodoro “Doro” F. Valencia of the Manila Bulletin. As may be expected, Mr. Valencia did not lift a finger. They then approached Col. Rosales, chief of the Presidential Action Unit, on May 1 but were again denied entry to Malacanang. On June 6, they went to Defense Sec. Enrile and the NPC but to no avail. Then on July 7, they tried asking Asst. Executive Secretary Ramon Cardenas for an appointment with the president but were denied. Finally, they approached Comm. Sinsuat of the Commission on National Integration (CNI) on November 3 but had to return home to tell the sad news to their communities.

Government responses to the resistance was mixed and varied. At the onset, Marcos sent his Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor who studied the project’s feasibility and impact. He was however assigned to a diplomatic position abroad. Prof. Cuyugan of the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies (PCAS, now the Asian Center), a government think tank, took the helm and warned Marcos of the project’s dire consequences.

When this did not work, the government sent in the PANAMIN and its flamboyant director, Manuel “Manda” Elizalde. Employing the same tactics he used in Mindanao, Manda brought with him agricultural tools, food stuffs, medicines, sports equipment, even scholarships and later on cash (read: bribes) for the communities affected. Among his favorite was medical missions to remote communities. Manda also resorted to what he did to “tame” many indigenous communities in Mindanao – bring them to Manila to enjoy the amenities of modern life. Later, PANAMIN resorted to classic `divide and rule’ tactics by organizing elders and community leaders to support the dam project. But the people were principled and united in their fight against the dam. They spurned PANAMIN’s offerings by forging an agreement among these communities, some signing with their own blood.

PANAMIN was able to convince some communities in supporting the dam’s construction. Aside from convincing residents of Bangad, Tanglag, Balbalan to resettle in Tabuk, one method they resorted to was to organize indigenous communities far from the project sites. More of those who supported PANAMIN came from areas unaffected by the dam project, so that those directly affected who consisted less than those unaffected and thereby became the minority. It was thus easy for PANAMIN to demonstrate that those who opposed the dam were small compared to those who approved of the project. They were then used to show the government and international funders that the project had the support of the majority. And that those who opposed the project consisted only of the minority.

However, many other leaders stayed the course in spite of the tremendous amounts of bribes and pressure. Many refused to accept such aids or attend meetings meant to soften their opposition to the dam. One such example was Juan Ganagan from Bangued, Abra. He refused to endorse the project even after a helicopter ride around Manila Bay and a speedboat ride to Corregidor. He was handed cash by both the NAPOCOR and Manda Elizalde but refused. Said he, “no surat dyta apo ket maidpon akammok ay manfasa, no pilak nat maidpon elakok an chaayo, pangaaciyo ta paryawonak” (if this envelop is a letter, I don’t know how to read, if it is money, I have nothing to sell so please let me go). During the long struggle in the Cordillera, Juan Ganagan lost a son who was killed by elements of the Constabulary.3

Elizalde’s imperious and condescending attitude towards the Cordillera communities was a blessing in disguise for those working against the dam. While his persona as a patron and savior may have worked well with lumad communities, the same could not be said of the peoples of the Cordillera. Being the majority population and with economic sufficiency and a complex and extensive political organization, PANAMIN’s tricks did not work at all, exposing the other side of Elizalde’s cultivated image. Several reports written by SCAPS personnel in the area (all women) reveal the true intentions of Elizalde and PANAMIN4.

If Elizalde sounded infuriated, it is because 1.) the pangats (village elders/leaders) were asking their constituents not to attend the meetings initiated by the PANAMIN; and, 2.) in contrast to the subservient and deferential to him, in the Cordilleras he found himself unwelcome and undesirable.

In a dialogue between PANAMIN and the residents of Liglig at around 4:00 o’clock PM on November 5, 1975, Elizalde berated the people in this manner, to wit:

Elizalde: What are your problems? 

People: We do not have problems except the dam project.

Elizalde: How stupid you are! Dam is your only problem. I have seen a child with a very big neck and you said there are no problems? 

People: Of course, we have other problems, basically, footbridge, irrigation, feeder roads, and schools, but primarily, the dam project. 

Elizalde: Stop! That woman said a while ago that you do not have other problems! 

People: Yes, we have other problems but there is no use solving those little problems if big problems like the dam project remains unsolved. If the dam project is solved, the small problems will be solved sooner or later. 



Elizalde: I do not believe that the dam project is your only problem according to that woman. Bishop Claver is using the people for his interest. Religious groups are collecting money for the people to fight the government.

Herminia Calixto was arrested by locals supportive of the PANAMIN and interrogated by Elizalde himself on November 30, 1975 in Tinglayan, Kalinga, to wit:

Elizalde: Where are the two radicals? (referring to her two other co-workers, Vilma Chollipas and Virginia Atuan)



Herminia: I don’t know.

Elizalde: You are from Tanglag, the two ladies are from Bontoc. Why are here if you really are on vacation? 

Herminia: We want to see you. 

Elizalde: Somebody told me that were sent by SCAPS and you said a while ago that you are … what? 

Herminia: AMRSP, but SCAPS is a member of the AMRSP.

Elizalde: Being with the SCAPS for five months and not seeing your parents, instead of going directly to Tanglag, you came because of a mission. You know, you taught the people of Botbot to fight.

Herminia: Huh! Fight for? 

Elizalde: Stupid! I know your plan to raise money for the people. Is this the religious help and take you as their tool? It was written in the Bible, “help others who help themselves!” 

Herminia: Yes, sir.

Elizalde: My poor young lady, look at my face. I know from the start that you are a liar. Will you tell me the truth about your mission?

Herminia: I don’t have any mission. 

Elizalde: What is your plan now? 

Herminia: Since I don’t have a job, I must go home and help my parents in the field.

Elizalde: Bull shit! Is that your plan after your parents supported your education? 

Elizalde’s licentiousness and debauchery with indigenous women is an open secret among anthropologists and scholars working on lumads in Mindanao. This reputation was displayed again in the Cordilleras when he and PANAMIN entered the fray. The report of the three female SCAPS workers was telling, to wit:

“During his visit to Bangad, Secretary Elizalde ordered the girls and women to remove their blouses and to dance topless `as real Kalingas do.’ After the dance, he requested a fair and pretty girl, Taclao, to his quarters to join his other female followers. He was willing to pay 1,250 (pesos) on the spot but was rejected by the girl’s relatives `since the girl might become pregnant’. Getting angry, Elizalde tore up the money and burned the remaining (ones) in front of the people. Later he forced the girl to accompany him."5

Eager to find a solution, Elizalde came up with a bold plan that would aim to hit many targets with one shot – bringing the pangats and other community leaders to Malacanang for an audience with the president. With a captured audience, a prepared statement and a scripted ceremony in the presidential palace, this would no doubt boost President Marcos as a problem-solver and compassionate leader and Elizalde’s stature as champion of indigenous peoples. 

Two convoys (one on December 5 and another on December 6, 1975) of pangats and community leaders were bused to Manila for an audience with the president and the First Lady on December 12. A press release by the Presidential Press Staff issued the following statement:

“Formerly strong oppositionists to the NPC project, the Kalinga leaders supported the dam project after being convinced by Secretary Elizalde that the construction of the dam will redound to the good of everyone concerned, the Kalingas particularly, and that accordingly the leaders unanimously adopted resolutions endorsing the program and pledging their support and cooperation to the administration.” 

On that meeting, the President signed Letter of Instruction 359 designating PANAMIN as the sole government entity authorized to operate within the areas covered by the dam projects and ordered the local government units and the military to support to the controversial agency.  More importantly, the President also signed Presidential Decree 848 creating a special development region to be called the Kalinga Special Development Region. Four municipalities of Kalinga-Apayao – Lubuagan, Tinglayan, Tanudan and Pasil – were to be “administered” by a Kalinga Administrator with a fixed salary but under the overall supervision of PANAMIN. 

Upon their return to Kalinga, the pangats revealed what really transpired – that they were separated, guarded and then forced to sign the alleged consent agreement. It was only after signing the document that they were allowed to see the President. As one of the leaders narrated: 

“The constant pressure kept us up for four or five days and nights … the question was whether to sign or not and the possible consequences … there were simple blank sheets, six of them with our names already typed and no text … you are forced to sign … but if you do not sign you will not go back with the others … Elizalde presented us as the recognized Kalinga leaders who came to express their desire to cooperate with the government in the development of Kalinga … no one dared to protest.”6

While much had been written about the communist footprint in the Cordillera struggle, not much is known about the presence or role community organizing (CO) efforts and the role of its practitioners, the community organizers. While communist organizing combined both political and armed struggles, CO focused on people’s participation in active non-violent resistance in the communities they operated on. 

Community organizing (CO) in the Philippines traces its roots in the efforts of Catholic and Protestant pastors who brought to the Philippines the techniques of Saul Alinsky in organizing working class and impoverished communities in Chicago. Alinsky pioneered in the technique of mobilizing people around a common issue which affects or concerns a particular community. This approach to organizing communities became known as the conflict-confrontation approach. This approach to organizing aimed to make the community discover power through collective action and break their dependency on traditional leaders, charismatic persons or strongmen to solve problems affecting communities. Community organizing aimed for people empowerment long before the term became fashionable. 

This type of organizing entered the Philippines as early as 1969. It was a time of ferment and would soon be put to the test upon the declaration of the martial law. The earliest organizational expression of community organizing was the Philippine Ecumenical Council for Community Organizing (or PECCO) ⁷ . Regardless of political beliefs, or none for some, PECCO’s community organizers (COs) believed in social transformation and total human development. In fairly recent lingo, this thrust may be referred to as people empowerment and COs as empowering populists.

Later, Catholic church-based NGOs doing organizing work developed, among them the   Share and Care Apostolate for Poor Settlers (SCAPS) which started its work in the Tondo district, Manila’s biggest slum area, but which later on moved to the Cordilleras, the Community Organizing of the Philippines Enterprises (or COPE) which focused on urban slum areas and PEACE Foundation which focused on rural or countryside operations. 

Though living under repression and authoritarianism, the tactics of community organizing ranges from the legal to the semi-legal. Writing letters and petitions, pressuring officials, media exposure to mobilizations and demonstrations are only some of the weapons that comprise the arsenal of community organizing to dramatize its issues and win them.

While CO has seen many success stories, one of the main criticisms against it is its lack of vision or ideology. The question often arises, after achieving its goals, what’s next for CO? Thus, the CO method was viewed by some as myopic for it focuses only on the community without regard to the larger community that they are part of. When faced with this question or dilemma, many a community organizer are oftentimes attracted by the ideology of the CPP which has a exhaustive understanding of the national situation and a comprehensive program for national liberation and social transformation.

The earliest contact with community organizers started in 1974 when locals near the Chico and Pasil rivers noticed the presence of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) engineers doing survey work. When word reached the locals that dams would be built on these sites, they started reaching out for help. Anglican pastors serving in the area and Bishop Francisco Claver, S.J., himself a prominent member of a Bontok family. They soon connected with SCAPS and soon, a delegation of papangats (village elders) was sent to Manila. In response, Oscar Francisco, SCAPS head and himself a veteran community organizer, went to Kalinga to organize communities in resisting the construction of dams along the two rivers ⁸ .

It was about this time when Prof. Mariflor Parpan, an anthropologist from the University of the Philippines learned of their plight and took it upon herself to bring it to the public. She first wrote Bp. Francisco Claver, S.J., a Bontoc, but then assigned to Malaybalay, Bukidnon. Atty. William Claver, himself a Cordilleran born in Benguet to parents from Bontok, also took part in the struggle. As co-founder of the Free Legal Assistance Group (or FLAG), Atty. Claver brought fellow human rights lawyers Senators Jose Diokno and Lorenzo Tanada to task. Immediately, Bp. Claver wrote Pres. Marcos about the dangers of pushing with the government’s construction plans. ⁹

By 1975, a conference was held at the St. Bridget’s School in Quezon City to map out a plan to resist the planned dam project. Tribal leaders headed for Manila and held a conference together with supporters and a bodong with themselves from May 10 to 13, 1975 at St. Bridget’s School along Aurora Blvd. in Quezon City. Speakers included Bp. Francisco Claver, S.J., and former Sen. Jose W. Diokno. Among the terms of the bodong were:

1. The peoples of Kalinga and Bontoc were prohibited from working for the dam project;
2. Should a Kalinga or Bontoc working for the dam project, those who opposed the project would not be held accountable; 
3. The sons of Kalinga and Bontoc peoples in the military should be warned not to be too harsh to those who opposed the dam; 
4. That the people of Kalinga and Bontoc are prohibited from selling their goods or produce, or giving food to the employees and workers of NPC; and. 
5. Those who were found to have been bribed in favor of the NPC shall be dealt with, including the death penalty.

To strengthen the bodong ¹⁰ and continue the organizing process, the Ad Hoc Committee for Bontoc and Kalinga was created with the institutional support of the Vochong Supporting Groups, Share and Care Apostolate for Poor Settlers (SCAPS), National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP), National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), Institute of Social Order (ISO) and the Asian Social Institute (ASI). In effect, the bodong would tie up all the tribal communities (ili) into what would eventually be the common struggle of the Cordillera peoples and a strong desire for a nation based on its imaginings. 

Resisting the Chico River Dam project consisted of a two-pronged strategy of 1.) popularizing the issue and acquiring popular support in the wider public, and, 2.) organizing the local communities for collective action. Among the tactics employed for the first strategy included social investigation and writing an information kit for media and support groups, writing letters and sending delegations to concerned officials, media exposure. Convening a bodong among various Cordillera ethnic groups was essential in fostering unity but so were conferences that outlined the general thrust of the resistance. Formation seminars and community action ranging from blocking NAPOCOR’s heavy equipment from entering the area to harassing its personnel served as … 

The strategy developed by SCAPS involved two tracks – external and internal. Externalizing the issue to gain attention and sympathy involved sending a delegation to Malacanang to deliver the message of the Cordillera peoples personally to President Marcos to writing the president of the World Bank pleading to stop funding the project because of the damages it will bring to the people’s way of life and the environment. At the same time, these tactics were complemented by mass actions at the local level. From 1975 until 1977, organized residents harassed NAPOCOR encampments in their areas by dismantling their quarters and blocking the entry of heavy equipment. Perhaps the highpoint of the non-violent struggle was the march of women from Sadanga and Maanit towns of Mountain Province to the NAPOCOR campsite and bared their breasts as the ultimate form of protest to shame government engineers and workers. 

Another tactic SCAPS used to solidify opposition to the dam was to organize visits to resettlement sites where those affected families by previous dam projects were relocated. To their shock, they found out that no farms were given at all, besides these sites lacked basic amenities. Furthermore, they learned that some of the lands they vacated (in Binga and Ambuklao) were not used for its intended purpose but were taken over by army veterans. This further stiffened their resolve not to give in to the government’s demands for them to leave their lands.

In order to salvage the situation and its image, PANAMIN tried hard to come up with a dialogue with which it believed held the key to solving the impasse. A top-level meeting between Church officials and PANAMIN was held. The Provincial Superiors of the Jesuits and CICM (Congregatio Immaculati Cordis Marie or Missionaries of the Immaculate Heart of Mary), Fr. Benigno Mayo and Fr. Carlos van Ooteghem, respectively, initiated a dialogue to iron out differences. In response, Sec. Elizalde himself with other top aides represented the agency while the Church was represented, among others, by Bp. Claver of the Malaybalay diocese, Fr. Joaquin Bernas of the Ateneo, Fr. Rex Mansmann, Passionist priest serving the T’boli community, and a CICM priest serving the Tinglayan community in Kalinga, Fr. Gilbert Obin. The meeting had the sanction of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines. It must be noted that a mechanism to resolve possible conflict between the Church and military existed – the Church-Military Liaison Committee or CMLC – convened in times when the military arrests church personnel or conducts searches on church institutions. 

The dialogue focused on the methods PANAMIN used that the Church found contrary to its ethics and teachings. On many occasions, PANAMIN’s practices in the communities it tries to serve often conflicted with priests and parishioners. PANAMIN after all had a different mission than the church even if it professes to serve the nation’s indigenous communities. Thus, the Church found out that in many communities where PANAMIN was present, the experiences they had was fairly common. 

Two of the issues discussed in the meeting were found to be urgent as they threatened the communities directly and the Church’s organizing thrusts in general. The first one was the practice of giving allowance to community members. Whereas church organizing focused on voluntary work, giving allowance to community members meant to draw them away from Church organizations. PANAMIN rationalizes this practice as a form of support, though it is seen by others as bribe. Allowances were supplemented periodically by other “gifts” – to food stuffs, agricultural tools to scholarships. Eventually, this group would find itself in conflict with the rest of the community as they are now supportive of PANAMIN’s position. 

More worrisome was the practice of arming local communities under the pretext of defending themselves from armed groups. The truth however is that arming locals is meant to intimidate those who oppose government’s development plans. By so doing, these armed groups had become in effect, vigilantes or a government paramilitary group. 

In the same meeting, Bp. Claver decried the fact that PANAMIN designates its chosen or favorite local leaders as datu even if they are clearly not. An example cited was that of Bai Tuan, the T’boli leader Elizalde cultivated as head of the T’bolis in South Cotabato.

One of the tactics used by the community in resisting the dam was to dismantle the encampment of NAPOCOR engineers and workers. There were a number of raids done by residents and in one of those attacks, an employee of NAPOCOR was killed and a few others wounded (source?). 

This alarmed the government that soldiers were then sent to guard the area. In a way, the success of these mass actions led to the militarization of the area. To augment the local police forces, the Constabulary was called in. With the arrests of many residents, resistance seemed to have subsided. But human rights abuses only angered the residents. This was the condition when communist organizers came in, and armed resistance became an attractive option. 

The military then went on identifying and arresting those involved. As may be expected, tracking and arresting those involved was difficult. What the military resorted to was to invite the villagers for a supposed meeting and using information taken from those organized by PANAMIN in the province, arrested those whom they believed were involved in the raids. The arrests took place from __ to December of the following year. Some were detained for a few days, while those whom they suspected of being part of the core group were sent to Camp Olivas in Pampanga. Only with the intercession of Sen. Jose W. Diokno and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) were they released later on. 

When asked Imakaya namfochang? (Why naked!) Is true that you removed all your tapis (traditional wrap around skirt)? One of the women, Kalling, recalled: “Yes, there were eight of us who joined the dismantling of the NPC camp, namely: Mangkad(+), Chinsu’ Palat (very old), Chinsu’ Wakar(+), Tichong Tayab(+), Kalling Sungngay, Chalyn Linang, It was during the time of martial law when the government have started the construction of the dam. The NPC began drilling with the use of powerful machineries in Fagyunas, in the boundary boundary of Basao and Tongrayan, that would have submerged and destroyed our rice terraces, the source of our food.“ (source).

Another protestor, Chalin, remembered: “I was-the youngest of the 8 women who helped dismantle the camp of the NPC and the military near the drilling site along the Chico river banks. We have already dismantled the NPC camp when the government forces came and captured us.”

Challin added: “We were continuously beaten by the military who arrested us. They used logs and the back of their long rifles in beating us. The military pointed their long guns towards us, while forcing us to walk towards the military truck, forcedly throwing us at the back of their truck, then brought us to Tinglayan municipal hall where we were detained for 1 night then the next day. They then brought us all to Tabuk where we were detained for four (4) months. We did not eat for three consecutive days, upon imprisonment. It was only on the fourth day of our detention when former congressman sent us food. On the days that followed, we were given food which was composed only of a little amount of rice with few leaves of kangkong. That was the kind of food that were given to us almost every day for 4 months. we were thankful still than have nothing to eat at all. That is why, after four months of being detained, we all became so skinny like skeletons and could barely walk.” 

Another participant, Kalling, added: “There were times when the military just forcefully pushed us to a corner of our detention cell with the use of their rifle. Why, I asked? For the whole duration of our detention, we also never took a bath, there was no water to use for bathing.” She then recalled: “I was one of those who removed clothes, thinking that like the men in our village, it is shameful to even look at a naked woman, much more touch (her)” But it was not in vain, the military pinned both my legs, forcedly clumped my shoulder then dumped me at the back of their big truck, all naked. I tried to jump out of the truck to escape but a soldier hit me with the back of his rifle hard and was again thrown back.” 

When asked about her recollections of the event, if she remembered also shedding off her clothes, Chalin added: “I think so, since I was the youngest in the group, I followed what the older women did. When the older women were arrested, I hid in the thick vegetation near the camp. After sometime, I thought the military left so I came out, only to find out that they were secretly waiting for me. So, I too, even merely a girl during that time, was arrested.” 

“When we were released from our imprisonment, we immediately headed home, walking from Tabuk to Basao barefoot for two days. We started at around two o’clock in the afternoon of August 14, 1974 and reached Basao the next day. We had nothing to eat, we only drank water from springs that we passed by. We walked without resting, even if we were so hungry and could barely walk as we were not fed while in detention. We were so eager to reach our village. Both my feet became very swollen because of walking barefoot for two days without rest.” 

Chaling and Kalling both pondered, “When I recall what the military did to us at present, I could have resorted to revenge easily revenge, especially since my husband was the village captain. In fact, we even accommodated and fed soldiers who came to visit our house. I never had any intention of harming the soldiers. But during those early years, after our four months detention and with our suffering from the hands of the military then, I really wanted revenge. But at present, the military are totally different, I could just easily go near one and pinch him. That is because we already have co- villagers and even relatives who are now soldiers.” With the Chico River dam project shelved permanently, the people of Kalinga no longer feel threatened. They no longer see the military as they saw them during the martial law years. In fact, some of the young men have enlisted in the government’s armed services. 

Reflecting on their struggles then, Chaling and Kalling noted: “It was only in Basao among the Tinglayan villages which saw women fight against aggressive development. All the other villages had no women warriors, only their men came together and fought the government forces. But we joined our men in fighting against the construction of the Chico dam which could have wiped out our rice fields, the main source of our living.”

As to why women chose to fight instead of the men, the participants recalled noticing that on many occasions during the (forcibly attended) meetings, military personnel had dagger looks on the men. Sensing danger, the women decided to carry on the mass actions instead not only to prevent physical harm to the men but also to ensure that the farms would be tended and thereby guarantee food on the table. 

These mass actions earned women due recognition, putting them on the pedestal so to speak, when it comes to community affairs. Later on, they were assigned leadership roles traditionally held by men. Indeed, their courage, determination and sacrifice empowered women in the same way as men were, forged in fire, in the struggle for life, heritage and identity. That the willingness of women to be at the forefront of the struggle, to bear the burden of sacrificing oneself for the community more than, if not equal to men, could never be discounted.

This portion examines the lives of two women warriors who were also wives of two famous fighters who became prominent during the struggle for the Cordilleras. Tina (pseudonym) was the second wife of Fr. Conrado Balweg while Leah was married to Ka Zungar. Both Fr. Balweg and Ka Zungar were both fighters of the New People’s Army but separated from the armed group later on. From the all-Igorot(?) Lumbaya Company of the NPA, Fr. Balweg formed what later on became the Cordillera Peoples’ Liberation Army (CPLA) while Ka Zungar formed the Montanosa Command (?). In many ways, these two women married not only their men but also the cause they espoused. Love was not only about romantic love between a couple but included love for land and its people. Marriage transcended traditional roles and boundaries. Women were not only homemakers but included an active role in community affairs; and in some cases, leaving families to join their husbands in the battlefields. 

The entry and success of legal, non-communist organizing in the Cordillera region became possible because of the vacuum left by earlier organizing efforts, in particular the CPP/NPA. As early as 1971, party organizers entered the Cordillera as an expansion. From Tarlac, the base of the earlier communist party, (the PKP), the new, revitalized party identified Isabela to be its rear base. Expansion into the Cordillera seemed like a logical outcome of its organizing efforts (Castro: 1994, 194-9) However, the declaration of martial law in 1972 military offensives against the CPP/NPA in northern Luzon saw the decimation of latent organizing efforts. Furthermore, organizers already saw the inapplicability of the CPP ideology vis-à-vis the Cordillera communities. The proposal to form a separate armed group outside the NPA, the Igorot Liberation Army, that reflected more indigenous perspectives on the Cordillera struggle brought about a bitter debate and factionalism within the regional party committee.  Thus, it was only in the last few years of the 1970s when the CPP/NPA was able to regain a foothold in the Cordillera and started organizing (Castro, 201), this time more successfully as the resistance to the Chico River dam had become “ripe.”

This time, the CPP/NPA’s reentry in the Cordillera made use of traditional customs. The bodong was used to gather and organize different ethnolinguistic groups in the region. Joining the NPA and killing enemies (those who seek to destroy their land and tradition such as soldiers, policemen, NAPOCOR engineers and PANAMIN personnel) reaffirmed the warrior tradition and the fulfillment of full manhood in the Cordillera. Armed struggle became the substitute for traditional headhunting practices common in tribal warfare. But there was one practice that the CPP/NPA brought with them – the introduction of the concept of women warriors. That women can also bear arms and fight alongside their male comrades (Castro, 202).

(Interview by Therese Grail Lawagan, Buscalan …, Kalinga, October 15, 2022)

Tina is the daughter of Francisco Borway and Potao Borway. Tina had five other siblings, namely: Kadyaman, Fillig, Carol, Chaus and Whali. The family is from Buscalan … and where Tina went to school until he reached Grade 5. The following year she went to Labuagan to continue her studies. However it was cut short to due to a tribal conflict and she had to go back to Buscalan to avoid being caught in the conflict. Said she: “I hated the bodong system since I didn’t really understand it then, for me it was the reason why my studies had been stopped.” 

She recalled her initial involvement with the NPA, thus: 

“As early as 1982, there was a group of NPA named Yunit Guerilla (YG) which oftentimes conducted schooling (political education) in Buscalan. I then attended their gatherings since the group since we were always encouraged to these sessions. I was convinced of the YG and their cause - to fight the government and their system of capitalism & feudalism which manipulating the people. I was very young when I joined them, I think I had not started menstruating yet.” 

After 3 years (1985), she was allowed to have a vacation in Buscalan. At that time, there was a military operation in Buscalan, so she was asked by a villager to proceed to another NPA camp located in another barangay, Bugnay. The camp was under the command of Ka Ambo (Fr. Condrado Balweg). Tina did not fall in love at first sight nor did she have any feelings for Ka Ambo then.

“Foon khus pion a’ Ka Ambo, tan marong-ay kay. Annan safali way pio’ tan idi, way mas mernus as Ka Alvin.” (I did not have any feelings for him then, for he was a lot older than me. I was eyeing for another younger co rebel named Ka Alvin)

Tina was not allowed to leave the camp by Ka Ambo. When she thought of leaving the camp, Ka Ambo refused. At first because Ka Ambo needed her as she was an acupuncturist. Ka Ambo was hit in his left shoulder in an encounter so his arms did not function well. Unknown to her, it was because of another reason:

“Basta awad skuling ni kos, anayun na iyug-is nan I love you.” (Whenever he is conducting education sessions, he always wrote the words I love you and Mahal na mahal kita to me).

The military attacks continued and we had to move from one place to another. Ka Ambo always asked me to carry his jacket, which by the way was very smelly, she recalled while laughing. It was in April 1985 when Ka Ambo called for Tina’s father, Francisco, to formally ask permission to marry Tina. According to Tina’s uncle Ayangao who accompanied her father, Francisco’s reply was “Chaayu otya, (it is up to you, if you want to be together)”.

Marrying a priest who had an earlier wife was certainly complicated. Fr. Balweg had not received dispensation yet so he remains a priest. His first wife, Corazon, a social worker, was in detention after being captured by the military when he courted Tina. By the time they lived together, Corazon was released by the military, further complicating Tina’s relationship with Ka Ambo and his first wife. 

There was however no quarrel nor confrontation between the two wives. As she recalled, “I had never felt any problem with my relationship with Ate Azon (Corazon), perhaps because she was older, more mature and Ka Ambo was very good at moderating our relationship. Though there were times that I felt insecure and hurt, wishing to be the only wife but as I have said, Ka Ambo was very good at moderating and Ate Azon never intimidated me, so I just let go of my jealousy”.

For Ka Tina, women were generally treated fairly by the movement, in fact, they were given extra allowance never ever given to men – sanitary napkins for monthly periods. Though patriarchy existed in the movement as men had mistresses other than their wives. The leadership however tries to resolve these issues as far as possible. In some units, the punishment may even be death. But in Ka Ambo’s unit, demotion and the cancellation of authority were meted to transgressors.   

Ka Tina recounted her days as a woman warrior, thus:

“Since military operations were continuous, we have to move from one place to another, establishing temporary camps in strategic places where it is difficult for the military to reach. We set up our camps in areas that are reached only by crossing big bodies of water and passing through deep ravines, so that the military will not easily reach us, our main camp was established in such an area, at Bagbagan, Betwagan, Mt. Province”. 

“Women were not spared, pregnant or not, we have to join in the firefights. Women were only asked to stay put in the camp when they reach 5 months into their pregnancy. Bu in my case, I persistently followed Ka Ambo to where the fight was even when I was very pregnant with Jordan (our only son). It was in Bagbagan camp where Ka Ambo called for my father, to ask his blessings for us to be a couple.”

“We left Bagbagan as a couple on Sept. 2, 1985 then built another camp in Ferwang, then to Mt Sumangchil. When she was about to give birth in January 1986, she was brought to Buscalan, and gave birth to Jordan.” 

“It was sometime in April of 1986 when Ka Ambo informed her that he and his group will split from the NPA. Ka Ambo argued that the NPA-NDF had a very different ideology, i.e., to overthrow the government while Ka Ambo’s group was to resist the aggressive development taking place in the Cordillera Region, in particular the Cellophil project in Abra and the Chico dam project in Kalinga.” 

In the end, Ka Tina conceded that E.O. 22 addressed some of their grievances they fought for. However, their dream for real autonomy and self-determination remains a goal they have to struggle for.

Ka Leah married Ka Zungar (Ernesto Garado), the leader of the Montanosa Brigade. Like Tina, Leah became politically involved due to the Chico River dam issue. Tina had seven siblings. And as an elder, she had to stop by the time she reached Grade 6 as she had to babysit her younger siblings while their parents worked the field. 

Ka Leah had her first child in 1980 (Subad) in Bugnay, Tinglayan and her second, Mangnangged, in 1982 also in Tinglayan. The third and last child, Dimacli-ing, was born in 1984 in Sagada, Mountain Province. She however had to ask her brother, Saga-oc, to take care of her youngest child when she decided to go full time in the fight of their lifetime. 

Leah met Ka Zungar in 1977 who was one of the CPP cadres sent to organize in the Cordilleras. As he was a Visayan and not protected by any bodong, he was liable to get caught or killed in tribal wars. The solution came in his marriage to Leah. 

Leah recalls her time in the movement, to wit:

“I recall one of the worst attacks by the military, we were hit with mortar that injured many and the death of some comrades. Women warriors, except me, were brought to safety before the attack, so there were no women casualties. We were in our camp at Mt. Binaratan, Tanudan during the attack. We were trapped for a month with no food and supplies, so we had to eat whatever edible leaves were there such as Pi-aw (wild taro/gabi) and pa-it (rattan shoots) that grew mountainsides. Later, we ran out of rice. We barely ate for almost a month, and we survived by eating whatever edible leaves we could find. This was the worst experience that we had since we did not eat rice for almost a month. After more than a month, my husband, Ka Zungar, saw an opportunity for the rest of the group to escape, so we escaped towards to Bugnay and then proceeded to Buscalan.”

“I always have to bring my two kids wherever we go. One time when the military was in hot pursuit, my husband asked the help of his uncle, Fr. Garado, an Anglican priest uncle, who came and took our two kids and brought them to the Visayas region, my husband’s hometown. It really pained me. The most painful experience for me was every time, one of my kids will be separated from me, I could endure all kinds of hardships but I always felt pain in my heart whenever my kids are separated from me.”

Like Tina, she admits that the dream of an autonomous Cordillera remains elusive.

In the immediate aftermath of the democratic transition in 1986, the Cory Aquino administration actively sought to make peace with the Cordillera rebels headed by Fr. Conrado Balweg. Both sides agreed to a cessation of hostilities and a historic meeting between Pres. Aquino and Fr. Balweg was held on Mt. Data to begin the process of realizing the dream of autonomy and self-determination. 

But all is not well within the Cordillera rebel movement. The boycott stance of the CPP marginalized the party during the final days of the dictatorship. That decision left a fierce debate within the CPP and resulted in the removal of Rodolfo Salas as Chair. There was a call for reassessment and also to introduce reforms within the CPP. It was in this context that the Lumbaya Company, the NPA unit composed exclusively of Cordillerans, broke away from the CPP on April 7, 1986 and established the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) led by former priests Fr. Conrado Balweg, Fr. Bruno Ortega and former seminarian Mailed Molina. 

Ideological differences were at the core of brewing tensions between the CPP and Fr. Balweg’s group several months before. The CPP’s emphasis on the primacy of class struggle, rooting societal ills on capitalist exploitation and the accent on subsuming local struggles under the umbrella of the national struggle did not bode well for the CPLA and its supporters. For them, the idea of class struggle, of pitting the working class or proletariat with comprador capitalists, feudal landlords and upper bourgeoisie was simply inconceivable. For it was beyond the realm of reality and experience in the Cordillera. A very traditional society where traditions and culture pervade everyday way of life, Cordillera remained for the most part under subsistence economy and land owned communally.     

Front organizations such as the Cordillera Bodong Association (CBA) and similar CPP formations was itself split from the fallout, some joining the CPLA while the others stayed with the CPP. One thing remained clear, the split within the movement would not mend or heal until today. The split finally came to a climax when Fr. Conrado Balweg’s convoy was ambushed in Abra on June 21, 1987. Though Fr. Balweg survived the ambush, a number of CPLA officials were killed. This pushed the CPLA to accept the overtures of the Aquino government for a ceasefire and negotiated settlement to the rebellion. Likewise, the bitter antagonism between the former rebels pushed the CPLA closer to the military, thereby giving the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) an important ally in clearing the Cordillera of CPP/ NPA elements. 

Later on, to justify the existence of the CPLA, a non-state armed force, the group was designated as the security force solely for the Cordilleras. As envisioned by Fr. Balweg and his comrades, the CPLA is security force of the Cordillera peoples, to protect its people from criminal elements but more importantly, their main rival the NPA. This development made the CPLA into a collision course with the NPA especially after the former declared its intention to talk peace with the Aquino administration while the latter pursued its armed struggle as it did during the previous regime. 

At the same time, the process of democratization was too good for the CPLA to pass. The new 1987 Constitution to replace the repressive 1973 Constitution of the ousted dictator. provided for the establishment of an autonomous region for the Cordillera as well as in Mindanao in Art. 10, Sec. 15, to wit:

“There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographic areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

To fulfill this dream, President Aquino signed Executive Order 220 (EO 220) in 1988 creating the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in preparation for the passage of law that would spell out the details of Cordillera autonomy and self-rule in 1988. The CAR consisted of the provinces of Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province and Abra. The Executive Order also called for the creation of the Cordillera Regional Assembly (CRA) and a Cordillera Executive Board (CEB).

By 1990, Republic Act 6766, or the Organic Act of the Cordillera, was ready to be submitted for a plebiscite. The law however was roundly rejected, with the sole exception of Ifugao Province which approved the Act. Seven years later, an amendment that would incorporate provisions as a compromise to other stakeholders, RA 8438, was submitted for another plebiscite. This time, it was the province of Apayao only that sanctioned the law. Today, the dream of self-rule and autonomy as envisioned by the CPLA remains, just that, a dream. ¹⁶  

The struggle over the Chico River dam project was one of the most successful community organizing efforts undertaken in the country in terms of its total success and appeal to the wider public. The success however was met by brutal repression by the state. Army and Constabulary units were deployed to the area in succession to intimidate locals and suppress resistance. Arrests, detentions, torture and eventually salvagings (extra-judicial killings) became the norm. Where non-violent struggle ended, the next phase of the struggle came with the entry of the CPP/NPA. 

… 

Endnotes

¹ The Moro Province was based in Zamboanga while Mountain Province was based in Bontoc. The pejorative terms Moro and Igorot have since been replaced by the Muslim / Bangsamoro and Cordillera, respectively. 

² Or the Presidential Assistance to National Minorities, successor to the Commission on National Integration (CNI) and later reformed into what is now the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 

³ Chico Documents (1978), Box 7, Cordillera Mass Movement Collection, Northern Luzon and Cordillera Archives of the UP Baguio Main Library (hereinafter referred to as CMMC/NLCA).

⁴ Report to Fr. Ted Anana from SCAPS workers. Fr. Anana worked for NASSA (National Secretariat for Social Action) of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). NASSA and SCAPS collaborated on the issue of the Chico River dam project. The workers who wrote the report were: Virginia Atuan, Herminia Calixto and Vilma Chollipen. (Folders 21 & 22, Box 10, Cordillera Mass Movement Archives (hereinafter CMMA), UP Baguio Main Library (hereinafter UPBML).

⁵ Field Report from Tinglayan, Dispatch to Fr. Ted Anana, Friends of the Igorots, November 15, 1975, Box , CMMC/NLCA. 

⁶ See Daily Express, Balita, Times Journal, Tribune issues of December 13, Sunday Express of December 14 and Bulletin Today issue of December 15, 1975.  

⁷ Lopa, Margarita A. 1995. Singing the Same Song: Reflections of Two Generations of NGO Workers in the Philippines. Quezon City: Asian NGO Coalition (ANGOC) and Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia (PhilDHRRA), 42-3.

⁸ Daluping, Silverio M. Narrative Report on the Chico Dam, July 4, 2020. < NARRATIVE REPORT ON THE CHICO DAM STRUGGLE (mam-oli.com)>. Accessed March 23, 2022, 10:45 AM (GMT+8).

⁹ Letter on Chico River Dam: To Marcos from Bishop Francisco Claver, Folder 3, Box 22, CMMC/CNLA. 

¹⁰ Vochong is the original term but the Ilokano term bodong is commonly used. 

¹¹ Castro, Nestor T. 1994. Ang Kilusang Komunista sa Cordillera: Pagtatagpo ng ideolohiya at taal na katutubong kultura, Philippine Social Sciences Review Special Issue (January – December) 194-99. (for Biblio., pp. 191-238). 

¹² Interviews conducted on Ka Tina and Ka Leah as well as an FGD with select Tinglayan residents were performed by Therese Grail Lagawan as contained in a written report entitled Focus Group Discussion on Eight Surviving Female Protestors, Tinglayan, Kalinga, October 11 and 12, 2021.

¹³ Montanosa was the name of the Social Action Center of the Diocese of Mountain Province. The government’s plan to construct the Agno III river dam project in Benguet was met by resistance similar to the peoples of Kalinga and Bontoc. When affected communities decided to join the armed resistance against aggressive development in the Cordilleras, they renamed themselves the Montanosa Brigade.

¹⁴ To clarify the issue, Fr. Balweg wrote a letter to Atty. Jose N. Nolledo, chair of the 1987 Constitutional Commission’s Committee on Local Governments (which also handled matters on local autonomy), dated August 22, 1989, inquiring on the constitutionality of a regional security force outside the ambit of the state. In reply, Atty. Nolledo replied that during the Commission’s deliberations, the question of constitutionality of such a regional force should be decided upon by the new Congress. As can be expected from a constitutionalist, Nolledo recommended that the CPLA be under the supervision of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a result, the CPLA became a non-state partner of the AFP in policing the Cordilleras. Viewed from the context of a “total war” between the AFP and the CPP, the CPLA could be viewed by the latter only as the state’s battering ram. Consequently, this would put the CPLA and the NPA on a collision course. If the conflict between two armed groups focused chiefly on ideology, this time the stage was set for a war of attrition. See Letter of Fr. Conrado Balweg to Atty. Jose N. Nolledo, August 22, 1989. Folder 16, Box 32, CMMC/ CNLA.

Separated from Kalinga Province in 1995 with the passage of RA 7878. .

¹⁵ The CPLA 11 Point Program for the single Cordillera autonomy: 

1. Consolidate the Cordillera Nation and the Cordillera State
2. Establish the Autonomous Government throughout the Cordillera Bodong
3. Preserve the indigenous tribal government and decision-making process characterized by direct democracy and collective leadership
4. Consolidate the inter-tribal unity among each of the Cordillera peoples and maintain their own internal autonomy and self-rule within the Cordillera Bodong
5. Preserve the indigenous socialism in the Cordillera 
6. Build modern industry and finance based on cooperativism 
7. Preserve and develop the Cordillera national culture 
8. Promote the Cordillera people’s appreciation and study of their own history, including unwritten history based on oral tradition and material culture 
9. Enhance the Cordillera people’s self-defense of nation and homeland
10. Enhance the Cordillera people’s unity with the various communities in the Philippine Archipelago and work towards the establishment of a federated Republic of the Philippines providing for a co-equal status of the majority and minority nations; and, 
11. Support strongly the cause of oppressed indigenous peoples throughout the world for self-rule and self-determination. (Fr. Bruno Ortega’s Presentation of the CBA-CPLA, Folder 5, Box 17, CMMC/CNLA).